IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 FOR THE 2 EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 3 JAMES D. BUTLER, III, 4 Plaintiff 5 Case No.: v. 6 7 NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC., COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 8 Defendant (Unlawful Debt Collection Practices) 9 10 **COMPLAINT** 11 JAMES D. BUTLER, III ("Plaintiff"), by his attorneys, KIMMEL & SILVERMAN, 12 P.C., alleges the following against NCO FINANCIAL SYSTEMS, INC. ("Defendant"): 13 14 INTRODUCTION 15 1. Plaintiff's Complaint is based on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 16 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. ("FDCPA"), which prohibits debt collectors from engaging in abusive, 17 deceptive, and unfair practices and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et 18 seq. ("TCPA"). 19 20 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 21 2. Jurisdiction of this court arises pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d), which states 22 that such actions may be brought and heard before "any appropriate United States district court 23 without regard to the amount in controversy," and 28 U.S.C. § 1331 grants this court original 24 25 jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the laws of the United States. -1-

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1	3.	Defendant conducts business and has an office in the Commonwealth of							
2	Pennsylvania and therefore, personal jurisdiction is established.								
3	4. Venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1).								
4	5.	Declaratory relief is available pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202.							
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6		PARTIES							
7	6.	Plaintiff is a natural person residing in Hartford, Connecticut, 06105.							
8	7.	Plaintiff is a "consumer" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).							
10	8.	Defendant is a national debt collection company with corporate headquarters							
11	located at 507 Prudential Road in Horsham, Pennsylvania, 19044.								
12	9.	Defendant is a "debt collector" as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)							
13	and repeatedl	y contacted Plaintiff in an attempt to collect a debt.							
14	10.	Defendant acted through its agents, employees, officers, members, directors							
15	heirs, successors, assigns, principals, trustees, sureties, subrogees, representatives, and insurers.								
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17		FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS							
18	11. At all relevant times, Defendant was attempting to collect an alleged co								
19	debt from Plaintiff.								
20 21	12.	The alleged debt at issue arose out of transactions, which were primarily for							
22	personal, family, or household purposes.								
23	13.	Within the one year prior to the filing of this Complaint and continuing through							
24	June 2011, D	refendant made continuous and repeated calls to Plaintiff in an attempt to collect							
25	consumer del	ot from Plaintiff.							
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14.	Defendant,	its employees	and	servants	harassed	Plaintiff by	making	continuous
calls and leavi	ng voicemai	l messages on	Plair	ntiff's hor	ne telepho	one number.		

- 15. Defendant placed repeated calls to Plaintiff's telephone almost every day, causing Plaintiff to receive, on average, more than two (2) collection calls a day and, at times, more than four (4) collection calls a day.
- 16. Defendant's repeated telephone calls to Plaintiff caused him to receive on average, more than twenty (20) collection calls a month.
- 17. Upon information and belief, Defendant used an automated telephone dialing system or pre-recorded or artificial voice when contacting Plaintiff on his home telephone.
- 18. Defendant left several voicemail messages on Plaintiff's home answering machine, each using a pre-recorded voice.
- 19. Plaintiff did not expressly consent to Defendant's placement of telephone calls to his home telephone by the use of an automatic telephone dialing system or pre-recorded or artificial voice prior to Defendant's placement of the calls.
- 20. None of Defendant's telephone calls placed to Plaintiff were for "emergency purposes," as specified in 47 U.S.C. §227(b)(1)(A).
- 21. Defendant's actions in attempting to collect the alleged debt were made with the intent to harass, abuse, annoy, and deceive Plaintiff into making payment.
- 22. Defendant intentionally engaged in this course of conduct stated above, to intimidate, mislead, cajole and confuse Plaintiff.

CONSTRUCTION OF APPLICABLE LAW

THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

- 23. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") is a comprehensive statute, which prohibits a catalog of activities in connection with the collection of debts by third parties.

 See 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The FDCPA imposes civil liability on any person or entity that violates its provisions, and establishes general standards of debt collector conduct, defines abuse, and provides for specific consumer rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. The operative provisions of the FDCPA declare certain rights to be provided to or claimed by debtors, forbid deceitful and misleading practices, prohibit harassing and abusive tactics, and proscribe unfair or unconscionable conduct, both generally and in a specific list of disapproved practices.
- 24. In particular, the FDCPA broadly enumerates several practices considered contrary to its stated purpose, and forbids debt collectors from taking such action. The substantive heart of the FDCPA lies in three broad prohibitions. First, a "debt collector may not engage in any conduct the natural consequence of which is to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connection with the collection of a debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. Second, a "debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means in connection with the collection of any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. And third, a "debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means to collect or attempt to collect any debt." 15 U.S.C. § 1692f. The FDCPA is designed to protect consumers from unscrupulous collectors, whether or not there exists a valid debt, broadly prohibits unfair or unconscionable collection methods, conduct which harasses, oppresses or abuses any debtor, and any false, deceptive or misleading statements in connection with the collection of a debt.
 - 25. In enacting the FDCPA, the United States Congress found that "[t]here is

abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many
debt collectors," which "contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability
to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy." 15 U.S.C. § 1692a. Congres
additionally found existing laws and procedures for redressing debt collection injuries to be
inadequate to protect consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.

- 26. Congress enacted the FDCPA to regulate the collection of consumer debts by debt collectors. The express purposes of the FDCPA are to "eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
- 27. The FDCPA is a strict liability statute. Taylor v. Perrin, Landry, deLaunay & Durand, 103 F.3d 1232 (5th Cir. 1997). "Because the Act imposes strict liability, a consumer need not show intentional conduct by the debt collector to be entitled to damages." Russell v. Equifax A.R.S., 74 F. 3d 30 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Gearing v. Check Brokerage Corp., 233 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding unintentional misrepresentation of debt collector's legal status violated FDCPA); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F. 2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
- 28. The FDCPA is a remedial statute, and therefore must be construed liberally in favor of the debtor. Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1235 (W.D. Wash. 2006). The remedial nature of the FDCPA requires that courts interpret it liberally. Clark v. Capital Credit & Collection Services, Inc., 460 F. 3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2006). "Because the FDCPA, like the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) 15 U.S.C §1601 et seq., is a remedial statute, it should be construed liberally in favor of the consumer." Johnson v. Riddle, 305 F. 3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2002).

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29. The FDCPA is to be interpreted in accordance with the "least sophisticated" consumer standard. See Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168 (11th Cir. 1985); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F. 2d 107 (3rd Cir. 1991); Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Service, Inc., 869 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1988). The FDCPA was not "made for the protection of experts, but for the public - that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the unthinking, and the credulous, and the fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take away its power to deceive others less experienced." Id. The least sophisticated consumer standard serves a dual purpose in that it ensures protection of all consumers, even naive and trusting, against deceptive collection practices, and protects collectors against liability for bizarre or idiosyncratic interpretations of collection notices. Clomon, 988 F. 2d at 1318.

THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 1991

- 30. In 1991, Congress enacted the TCPA, in response to a growing number of consumer complaints regarding certain telemarketing practices.
- 31. The TCPA regulates, among other things, the use of automated telephone equipment, or "autodialers." Specifically, the plain language of section 227(b)(1)(B) prohibits the use of autodialers to make any call to a residential telephone line in the absence of an emergency or the prior express consent of the called party.
- 32. According to findings by the Federal Communication Commission ("FCC"), the agency Congress vested with authority to issue regulations implementing the TCPA, such calls are prohibited because, as Congress found, automated or prerecorded telephone calls are a

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greater nuisance and invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls, and such calls can be costly and inconvenient.

COUNT I

DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT

- 33. In its actions to collect a disputed debt, Defendant violated the FDCPA in one or more of the following ways:
 - a. Defendant violated of the FDCPA generally;
 - b. Defendant violated §1692d of the FDCPA by harassing Plaintiff in connection with the collection of an alleged debt;
 - c. Defendant violated §1692d(5) of the FDCPA, when it caused the Plaintiff's telephone to ring repeatedly or continuously with the intent to harass, annoy or abuse Plaintiff;
 - d. Defendant violated §1692e of the FDCPA by using false, deceptive, or misleading representations or means in connection with the collection of a debt;
 - e. Defendant violated §1692f of the FDCPA by using unfair and unconscionable means with Plaintiff to collect or attempt to collect a debt; and
 - f. Defendant acted in an otherwise deceptive, unfair and unconscionable manner and failed to comply with the FDCPA.

COUNT II

DEFENDANT VIOLATED THE TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

- 32. Plaintiff hereby incorporates all facts and allegations specified in all preceding paragraphs, by reference as if fully set forth at length.
- 33. Section 227(b)(3)(A) of the Act authorizes a private cause of action for a person or entity to bring in an appropriate court of that state "an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation."
- 34. Section 227(b)(3)(B), of the Act authorizes a private cause of action for a person or entity to bring in an appropriate court of that state "an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation, or to receive \$500 in damages for each such violation, whichever is greater."
- 35. Defendants' conduct violated § 227(b)(1)(B) of the TCPA by making any call using any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial prerecorded voice to any residential telephone line without the prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated for emergency purposes.
- 36. The Act also authorizes the Court, in its discretion, to award up to three (3) times the actual damages sustained for violations.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, JAMES D. BUTLER, III, respectfully prays for a judgment as follows:

- a. All actual compensatory damages suffered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(1);
- b. Statutory damages of \$1,000.00 for the violation of the FDCPA pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A);
- c. All reasonable attorneys' fees, witness fees, court costs and other litigation costs incurred by Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1693k(a)(3);

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Statutory damages of \$500 for each violation of the TCPA, pursuant to 47 d. 1 2 U.S.C. $\S 227(c)(5)(B)$; and 3 Any other relief deemed appropriate by this Honorable Court. e. 4 5 DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 6 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiff, JAMES D. BUTLER, III, demands a jury trial 7 in this case. 8 9 10 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 11 DATED: 08-02-11 KIMMEL & SILVERMAN, P.C. 12 13 14 Amy L. Bennecoff Attorney ID # 202745 15 Kimmel & Silverman, P.C. 30 E. Butler Pike 16 Ambler, PA 19002 Phone: (215) 540-8888 17 Fax: (877) 788-2864 Email: abennecoff@creditlaw.com 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25